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Abstract
Vulnerability discovery and exploits detection are two wide areas of
study in software engineering. This preliminary work tries to combine
existing methods with machine learning techniques to define a metric
classification of vulnerable computer programs. First a feature set has
been defined and later two models have been tested against real world
vulnerabilities. A relation between the classifier choice and the features
has also been outlined.
1 Introduction
A software bug is an error, flaw, mistake, failure, or fault in a computer
program that prevents it from behaving as intended. Most bugs arise from
mistakes and errors made by people in either a programs source code or
its design. An unexpected behavior may present several consequences; a
system crash, data loss or corruption or, in other cases, the possibility for
a third party to run arbitrary code. The last case is commonly referred
to as vulnerability. Vulnerability exploitation is a core subject of study of
computer security; differnt domains present differnt sources of exploitation
that lead to a variety of attacks. Software Engineering provides several
techniques to discover aws in code and possible attacks. Many of these
techniques work by looking for patterns in source code and or by requiring
a user to manually create signatures for exploits, given known attack, to
later perform classication and recognition. Not every flaw, though, may be
an actual vulnerability and signature based recognition often is unable to
recognize unseen attacks [4]. The goal of this paper is to combine software
engineering with machine learning techniques to dene a metric to recognize
vulnerabilities and to build a model able to classify vulnerable code.
Exploitation of a program can result in severe consequences. Possible
goals of a malicious attacker include: gain privileges on a system (root
shell on a unix machine); access protected and condential data (credit card
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frauds); identity theft (phishing web sites). [5] Given a programming lan-
guage, application domain or operating system; vulnerabilities and exploits
will present different characteristics and problematics. This work is focused
on the study of a well known class of vulnerabilities found in C/C++ source
code:
• Buer and heap overows: an anomalous condition where a process
attempts to store data beyond the boundaries of a xed-length buer (or
heap). The result is that the extra data overwrites adjacent memory
locations;
• Stack overows: which occurs when a program writes to a memory
address on the programs call stack outside of the intended data struc-
ture;
• Format string bugs: attacks that can be used to crash a program or
to execute harmful code. The problem stems from the use of unltered
user input as the format string parameter in certain C functions that
perform formatting, such as printf()
Despite affecting different data structures these vulnerabilities may result
in injection into memory and execution of arbitrary code that may result in
an attacker exploiting the system. A typical C/C++ exploit is a program
which first aims to fill a memory buffer, place arbitrary assembly code (the
shellcode) in memory and take control over the program counter CPU reg-
ister to nally execute the injected instructions. Software engineering and
computer security provide a set of tools and techniques to both search for
aws in software and detect exploitation attempts on a system.
Two approaches to flaws discovery in software can be identified: static
analysis consists of scanning the source code of a program to detect pat-
terns of known errors [3]; dynamic analysis consists of executing a computer
program and monitor its behavior on the host system (memory tracing, disk
access, cpu usage) [1]. The preliminary work presented in this paper is fo-
cused on static analysis; this approach presents two main drawbacks. First
static analysis tools can not accurately discriminate between a general flaw
and a vulnerability. Second, many bugs can not be detected at all. In order
to address this issue we model vulnerability identification as a classification
task. We identified a set of feature that characterize the state of a computer
program. We collected a dataset of real world vulnerable code bases and we
annotated it according to the identified features. Finally we train and tested
two classifiers, Support Vector Machines and Fisher Discriminant Analysis,
to identify vulnerable programs.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe a model to
classify vulnerabilities and exploits and we introduce a taxonomy of feature
to characterize code bases. In Section 3 we report experimental results
obtained on a dataset we collected. Section 4 conclused the paper.
2 A model to classify vulnerabilities and exploits
2.1 Exploit classication
As a first step in our work we looked at correlations between a vulnerability
and its exploit that could provide a metric able to generate dynamic signa-
tures. Such a technique has been used with success in polymorphic worm
detection [8]. However, worms seem to be easier to characterize than this
particular kind of attacks. From the point of view of the code exploits are
all quite similar to each other and present an extremely simple structure
which is difficult to extract information from. Computational Linguistic has
been proved to obtain good results in exploit detection [6]. Given time con-
straints it was not possible to explore this approach in detail. In further
work it could be interesting to study how this approach can be combined to
machine learning to reach an even higher accuracy. Similarly to [2] and [7]
the focus of our work is on feature engineering and the definition of a metric
to evaluate code quality in relationship to possibly exploitable flaws. We
identify a taxonomy of features at different aggregation levels and we con-
sider both quantitative and qualitative aspects. As a point of departure we
defined features and complexity metrices based not on code properties only.
We take into account social indicators as parts of the software development
process.
2.2 Vulnerability classication
Despite the above mentioned problems, machine learning may still be used
to discriminate vulnerable source code from good one. As a simplication
awed but not vulnerable code is still regarded as good in this model. This
approach may seem strict, but it is important to note that software engi-
neering already allows us to nd aws in sources. The further step this model
aims to reach is to determine which of these aws may result in possible ex-
ploitable vulnerabilities. The most important task in building the model
was the choice of the correct features to properly characterize a vulnerabil-
ity. In order to dene a proper feature set, information extracted using code
auditing tools has been enriched by metadata discovered by analyzing the
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environment in which the software has been developed. To test the model,
a dataset has been collected by manually annontating existing vulnerable
and exploited open source software.
We used Fisher Discriminant Analysis (FDA) and Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM) to perform classification. Further experiments have been per-
formed by testing against a subset of features selected using Recursive Fea-
ture Elimination (RFE). The experiments have been carried out using the
mlpy suite 4.
2.3 Dataset
The dataset consists in 75 instances of awed open source software. 50 of
these code aws are vulnerabilities for which an exploit has been developed.
25 instances are aws that resulted in misfunctioning of the program without
introducing security risks. It is worth noticing that from a syntactic point
of view regular aws and vulnerabilities may often look very similar. What
makes a flaw exploitable is the type of data structure it aects and its rela-
tionship with other sensible parts of the code. The vulnerable data has been
collected from the 2008 GLSA vulnerability list 3. Buggy code samples have
been collected from projects bug repositories. Instances have been manually
labelled and annotated according to the previously described feature set.
Three layers of features have been dened.
• Features extracted by performing static analysis (layer 1 )
– write operations on buers (strings, integers)
– NULL pointer dereferences
– access to storage that may have been deallocated
– memory leaks
– returning a pointer to stack-allocated storage
– the value of a location is used before it is dened
These features have been selected by performing static analysis on
source code using splint 1 and cppcheck 2. Given the nature of vulner-
abilities we want to classify flaws that may result in memory tampering
will help to classify the software as possibly dangerous.
4http://mlpy.fbk.eu
3http://www.gentoo.org/security/en/glsa
1http://www.splint.org
2http://sourceforce.net/projects/cppcheck/
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• Features extracted by parsing flawed code
– use of safe libraries (buer checking)
– presence and complexity of if-then-else statements (layer 2 )
– presence of loops
– nature of the software (server vs. client application)
– number of calls to [cm]alloc
– size of the code
– use of recursive functions (may result in memory leaks). We run
a parsing over vulnerable code to characterize the environment
surrounding the features of layer 1. Use of safe libraries may
prevent memory tampering. A procedure with an high number
of loops, recursive functions or complex if-then-else statements,
on the other end, may be prone to human logical mistakes. Also
the nature of the software should be taken into account, since a
server application may be implemented using different routines
and design than a client.
• Metadata extracted from bugzilla, mailing lists, statistics and charts
(layer 3 )
– age of the code (more recent code is more likely to contain flaws)
– number of committers
– popularity of the program (the most popular, the more it has
been analyzed)
– popularity of the platform it is running on
– kind of platform
– reputation of the developers
– relation to security applications
– status of the code
– legacy vs. development
– exploitation history
These properties describe a social component behind the development of the
software. By analyzing real world vulnerabilities it is possible to try to char-
acterize the environment in which mistakes have been committed. The age
of the code and the number of people involved may give useful information.
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L1+L2 all features RFE
FDA .38 .58 .63
SVM .41 .63 .71
Table 1: Vulnerability classification accuracy (percentage)
The popularity of the program, operating system and architecture on which
the software runs may be indexes of the eort spent in debugging, testing
and peer reviewing. Teams of developers with high reputation in providing
tested and clean code or the relation of a program to security can be used to
judge the risk of a aw as well. The status of the code may give information
about the current development and maintenance of the project. These infor-
mation have been extracted by checking bugzilla repositories, charts of the
number of aws for a given program, quality statistics derived from comments
and threads on mailing lists and newsgroups. Features of layer 1 and layer 2
describe respectively the nature of aws found in code and properties of the
software. This is the kind of information usually searched for by security
analysts to later test for an actual vulnerability by developing a proof of
concept. The role of layer 3 is to enrich these properties by weighting the
possible risk of a software flaw being a vulnerability given the status of the
project and its history..
3 Results
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained with weighted SVMs and FDA
on different features subsets. Weights have been assigned based on the
presence of features from layer 3. The tests have been performed using 75%
of the dataset for training and the remaining 25% as test set. In order
to prevent overtting 10 fold cross-validation and bootstrapping have been
used to perform evaluation. Anyway, no sensible difference in accuracy has
been noticed performing tests without cross-validation and bootstrapping.
Reasons for this result can be justied by the small size of the dataset and
by the fact that learners with a strong linear bias has been used. The rst
experiment, L1+L2, uses only the rst two layers for training and classication,
thus resulting in an unweighted classiers that resembles the behavior of a
human researching for vulnerabilities. As expected, the results in terms of
accuracy are close to random choice. Given the presence of a flaw, it is
difficult to classify it as a vulnerability without actually coding a proof of
concept.
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The second experiment, all features, uses all three layers. We report
an improvement in terms of accuracy that seems to conrm the importance
of the social component in classifying the vulnerabilities as such. Given
that a source is awed, layer 3 provides useful information Finally the third
experiment has been carried on by selecting features via RFE. By taking into
account only the most relevant features we reported a performance boost in
the accuracy of both classifiers.
The results that emerge from this experiments seem to conrm that using
machine learning and taking into account factors not directly related to the
code can improve the classication accuracy; moreover, despite a difference in
terms of performance, the classier does not seem to play a big role compared
to the feature set. It is interesting to note that RFE deleted most of the
features of layer 1 and 2, where layer 3 showed to carry much information. In
particular determinant features seem to be the presence and complexity of
if-then-else statements, popularity of the program and platform, the relation
with security applications.
4 Conclusion
The aim of this project was to combine software engineering with machine
learning techniques to achieve vulnerabilities classication and exploit classi-
cation. While it was not possible to recognize attacks, detecting vulner-
able code could benet from machine learning. A result that emerge from
this study is that the feature set seem to have a dominant role over the
classiffication model.
Further improvements on this study would be extending the dataset with
more instances and add or remove features given the results highlighted by
RFE. Moreover, manually labeling the instances may have introduced bias.
A large scale survey on security mailing lists or open source teams may lead
to a more reliable and complete dataset. In terms of exploit recognition, it
could be interesting to nd a method to combine this model with language
models in order to build a dynamic signature generator.
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